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I. Introduction 
When Sam Kirkpatrick invited me to present a paper at this 
panel, I accepted somewhat hesitantly. Sam expressed an intereSt in 
a paper which would expoµnd on axiomatic models of decision making 
under risk c6MUR) and perhaps compare them to models arising from 
the social psychological tradition. Although I have been teaching and 
applying axiomatic models of risky decision making for some years, I 
must confess that prior to Sam's call I had seldom crossed the disci­
plinary border of social psychology. But, on the assumption that this 
paper at the least would force me to expand my intellectual horizons, 
I agreed to write it. 
During Christmas vacation I resolutely marched off to the 
library armed with a stack of citations from an earlier Kirkpatrick 
paper. The reading sessions which ensued proved very enlightening. 
I noted first that the social psychological approach is primarily inductive. 
Through repeated experimentation a fact is seemingly established; then 
researchers hypothesize about the mechanism which Could produce such 
a fact. In contrast, the axiomatic approach, of course, is deductive, 
The models are intended as primarily normative or prescriptive, not 
behavioral. One sets�down axioms which purport to embody principles of 
consistent decision-making, then ascertains which decision rules 
satisfy the axioms. Second, I noted that in social psyc�ological studies 
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risk is defined rather simply -- even casually -- and in relative terms. 
Of two alternative courses of action, the one with lower probability of 
success is the more ·risky. In axiomatic models risk is defined in 
different ways, a fact which the body of the paper will make clear. 
Third, in social-psychological studies I noticed that research attention 
Seems to focus more on the differences between risky decisions made 
by individuals and those made by groups, rather than on �he process.es
of individual DMUR. The latter receives attention only indirectly when 
researchers attempt to explain the differences between individual and 
group decisions. In contrast, axiomatic models of DMUR place the 
individual at center stage. Numerous models focus on collective 
decision making, but these all build on some specific model of individual 
decision making. 
What of the find_ings of social-psychological studies of DMUR? 
The phenomenon o: the risky shift I found both intriguing and puzzling 
intriguing because it seemed to be a solid, replicable fact, puzzling 
because I could not understand the nature of the fact. I personally find 
it almost impossible to answer the questions on the Choice Dilemma 
Questionnaire (CDQ). Consider the following: 
Mr. H., a college senior with considerable musical talent 
has the choice of going to medical school to become a 
physician, or of entering a conservatory of music to become 
a pianist--a career where success would not be as assured 
as it might be in the medical profession. Imagine that you 
are Mr. H. {or advising Mr. H. ). Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that your musical career would be a 
success, Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for him to go to the conservatory. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. H. should not go to the 
conservatory no matter what the probabilities of success. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that. his musical career would be a 
success. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that his musical career would be a 
success. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that his musical career would be a 
success. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that his musical career would be a 
,success. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that hiS musical career would be a 
success. 
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Now obviously a crucial bit of information is la.eking:  namely, what 
are the relative values Mr. H. attaches to being a musician, a doctor 
or a failure? If I am advising Mr. H., surely I need to know whether he 
barely prefers being a p
·
ianist to being a doctor, or whether he would 
sacrifice both legs and an eye to play at Carnegie Hall. Likewise, if 
Mr. H. failed at concert pianism, would he find happiness as a truck­
driver, or would he hang himself with piano wire? Anyone familiar with 
axiomatic theories of risky decision making (and hopefully most others 
too) would not think of advising Mr. H. lacking such information, But in 
the risky-shift experiments subjects typically are told only that they 
should presume the risky alternative more attra<'tive than the certain 
one, To answer the CDQ they clearly must make more precise assump­
tions; and this seems to me a likely source of the change in tlecisions 
betv:een the individual and group contexts: when individuals enter the group, 
their individual assumptions are modified during the group interaction 
and information exchange. I confess, however, that I could think of no 
reason why the modifications invariably produced 11riskier11 group 
decisions. So, I plunged on. 
I read about various explanations for the risky shift: diffusion 
of responsibility {Wai""'lach, Kogan and Bero, 1962}, risk as a value 
(Brown, 1965), information exchange (Teger and Pruitt, 1967), and· 
others. I admired the ingenuity evident in numerous experimental 
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designs; I read with interest Cartwrighes (1971
.
) doubts about the 
factual nature of the risky shift, And finally, I came full circle. In 
the more recent social psychological studies of DMUR researchers 
haVe focused on the nature of individual decision processes. And to my 
surprise, they have applied an axiomatic model of DMUR {subjective 
expected utility) to explain individual decision making and account for 
the risky shift (:Burnstein, ��· 1971; Vinokur, 1971). How ironic: 
After setting sail on the waters of social psychology I had landed on the 
familiar shores of axiomatic theory. 
This little intellectual odyssey at least gave me a clear 
rationale for writing this paper. To know axiomatic models of DMUR 
is not .necessarily to love them. Even should current and future social 
psychological research conclude that s�ch models meet with reasonable 
success in the laboratoJ;'y, I would advocate caution in giving them a 
central place in our storehouse of theoretical ideas. This paper 
contains some reasons for my hesitancy. In the sections which follow 
I will identify some of the behaviorally questionable axioms which 
underly the principal models of DMUR, point out some decision 
contexts in which these models fail, comment briefly on some newer 
(not necessarily better) models recently emerged from mathematical 
psychology, and fina."lly, address the problem of collective or group 
·decision-making. 
II. Establi�hed Models of DMUR 
Many years ago Knight (1921) proposed a trichotomous 
categorization of decision making contexts. According to Knight, one 
decides in the realm of certainty if every available action, ai
, leads t� 
a unique consequence, xi' 
{the xi 
may be vectors). One decides in the 
realm of risk if every action, ai
, leads to a consequence, xi
, ,with 
known probability, p (xi
/a
i
) .  'On.e decides in the realm of uncertainty 
• 
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if actions, a.,  lead to consequences, x., but the probabilities p (x./a.) 
l * 1 l l 
are unknown or not even meaningful. 
To consider this classification more closely, I will introduce 
a common representation of a decision problem (Figure l), 
� 
t 
• 
a l 
a2 
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a, 
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Figure 1 
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mn 
To interpret Figure 1, an act, a., ' results in a consequence, 
x . . • depending on the 11state of nature, 11 9,, which obtains. For example, 
� ' J 
the set, 8, might be 91: a Christian God exists; 9z: no Chri;stian God 
exists; the set of acts, a, might be a1: live c.. good Christian life; a2: 
eat, drink and be merry; filling in the consequences is left to the 
imagination of the reader. 
In light of Figure 1, we can say that certainty exists if one 
knows the unique 9. which holds. Risk exists if one knows the probability 
J --
distribution over the G .• Uncertainty exists if this probability 
•J 
• 
As we shall see many decision theorists no longer differentiate 
between the contexts of risk and uncertainty. 
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distribution is unknown or unknowable. {What is the probability that a 
Christian God exists?) . 
In principle, DMUC presents no problem. If one can assume 
that the decision maker has a preference ordering over the set of 
consequences, then one would expect him to choose the act which leads 
'to the most highly valued consequence. And despite the Simplicity of 
the certainty context, by posing some additional questions and defining 
some additional concepts economists have constrUcted an interesting 
body of theory about individual DMUC {e.g. Green, 1971). 
The best known axiomatic model of DMUR is von Neumann's 
and Morgenstern1s {N-M) (1947) expected utility theory. To paraphrase 
their principal result: 
EU: Given that a decision·maker satisfies a particular axiom 
set (to be discuss"ed below) there exist numbers U(x .. ) 
,, 
such t hat if he chooses the risky act, a. , for which 
' 
L:.p.U(x .. ) is at a maximum, he chooses in accord with 
J J lJ 
his preference for risky options. 
or The N-M axioms enable us to find numbers U(xij) (utilities 
subjective values), such that an ordering of available acts by their 
expected utilities represents the individual's preference ordering over 
risky alternatives. But what are the axioms which justify this neat 
trick? I will illustrate them by describing a simple experiment I have 
performed in various classes. 
I choose a subject and inquire whether he can rank order a set 
of potential Presidential candidates, say, Kennedy (K), Ford (F), 
Reagan (R), and Wallace (W). Let us assume that the student ranks the 
candidates K, "'F, W, R. This is the first axiom-- that decision makers 
rank consequences (both certain and risky) in a complete, transitive 
fashion, 
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Next, I give the subject a series of hypothetical choices between 
getting a lottery over his best and worst candidates and getting one of 
his middling candidates for certain, i.e. "Would you prefer F for sure 
or the lottery, (. 5 K, . 5 R)? 11 By varying the odds in the lottery I 
eventually locate a point of indifference, let us say 
F"'(.5 K ,  .5 R)::.=F 
W�(.3K • .  7Rl=W 
where ,...., signifies indifference. 
One of the axioms (Archimedian) of EU theory states that we always can - -
find numbers (. 5 in lottery F, and . 3 in lottery W ), which render the 
lotteries F, W indifferent to the certain consequences F, W, These 
numbers are the "utilities 11 of the theory. 
At this point I ask the student to choose between two compound 
lotteries, say 
L1 o (. 2 K, • 3 F, . 3 W, • 2 R] 
1-z [.4K, .IF • .  IW, .4R] 
while I predict his choice. In t�s �se I would predict L2. ,_
Between 
finding the lottery equivalents, F, W and the choice between L
1 
and L2, 
three more axioms come into play. 
The first of these axioms states that in every lottery in which 
the consequences F and W appear, we can substitute the lottery equiva-- -
J.ents, F and W, and not affect preferences over the lotteries, i, e. 
' 
L1 =(.2K, .3F, .3W, .2 R] �L1 =
(.ZK, .3F, .3W, .2R] 
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and similarly for L2• Another axiom then states that decision makers 
operate on lotteries according to the usual probability calculus, To 
wit, 
< = ( . 2 K, . 3 (. 5 K, • 5 R), • 3 (. 3 K, . 7 R), • 2 R] 
� (. 2 K, . 15 K, . 15 R, • 09 K, • 21 R, • 2 R] 
� [. 44 K, . 56 R] = <
'
Simil�rly, 
L
z 
= ( • 4 K, . I F, . I W, }4 R] � L2
' 
= ( . 4 K, . I F, • I W ,  . 4 R] 
� Lz = ( . 4 8  K, • 52 R] 
The final axiom, monotonicity, asserts that the lottery [pK, (1-p)R] 
' 
' 
is preferred to the lottery [p K, (1-P )R} iff p>p'. In our case L2 
is preferred to L
1 
given that . 48 >. 44. 
In sum, by employing the N-M expected utility axioms we have 
determined for our hypothetical subject that U(K) = 1, U(F) = • 5, U(WJ = 
* 
= .  3, U(R) = 0. By substituting these values ir.to o:ir original lotteries 
.L
1
, L2 we have found that the expected tttility of L1is.44 and the
expected utility of L2 is . 48, and given that the subject satisfies the 
axioms, a choice of L2 accurately reflects his underlying preference. 
I have performed this simple experiment between six and ten 
times over the last few years and have not yet failed in predicting the 
subject's choice between the two compound lotteries, L
1, L2
, even
* Be�ause preference intensity is not comparable across individuals, 
we arbitrar.ily choose the unit and zero of our scale by setting U(K) = I, 
U(R) = O. 
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when, as in the preceding example, the expected utilities were within . 1. 
Reason for optimism? Perhaps, but on the negative side I have also 
caught students consistently in a classic paradox created by Alla.is 
(Raiffa, 1968). 
(l) 
(2) 
Consider the two compound gambles which follow. 
$1, 000, 000 �a 
5 000,000 
�$ ;, ooo, 000 
�
;
-
$0 
a 
�10 
$5, 000, 000
< .90 
0 
2 
�$1, 000, 000 
� 0 
Figure 2 {Allais) 
In gamble 1, choice of a1 leads to a million dollars with certainty, 
whereas choice of a2 leads to a million dollars with probability , 89, 
five million with probability . 10 and nothing with probability , 01, 
Gamble 2 has an analogus interpretation, Now, it is not uncommon for 
students to choose a1)
n both gamble l and gam�le 2. Their reasoning 
'runs like this: 11ln gamble 1 I1ll take the million dollars with certainty--
10 
I1d feel terrible if I greedily tried for $5 , 000, 000 and got nothing. In 
gamble Z I1m likely not to win anything so .I'll go for the $5, 000, 000 
even though the odds are slightly worse than going for the $1, 000, 000." 
The kicker is that this pair of choices (a
1
, a
1
) is inconsistent for 
* 
expected utility maximizers. For, choice of a1 in gamble l implies 
that 
U(lM) > .  10 U(SM) + .  89 U(lM) 
or .11 U(lM) > .10 U(5M), 
while choice of a1 
in gamble 2 implies 
. 10 U(SM) > , 11 U(lM); 
and these implications ate obviously contradictory. 
When decision theorists run experiments like the above, they 
sometimes remove the malefactors to a separate room, verbally work 
them over, then emerge to report that the offending subjects have seen 
the error of their ways a.nd wish to change their choices {MacCrllnmon, 
1 9 6 8 ). I can report, however, that some subjects simply prefer 
to be inconsistent ac�ording to the expected utility model rather than 
�hange their choices from (a1, a1) to. something else. The problem 
seems to be that receiving 0 in the context of gamble 1 is different from 
receiving 0 in the context of gamble 2. B ut this in turn raises doubts 
** 
about the substitutability axiom of the EU m.odel. 
In sum, I have no doubt that the EU model of DMUR can achieve 
fairly good predictive accuracy in some situations, But I am equally 
* 
as is (a2, a2).
**
in a slightly different context one can show that the Alla.is 
·paradox casts doubt on Savage's 11Sure Thing Principle. 11 See below, 
pp. 13-14. 
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certain that one can formulate not-unreasonable examples-in which 
significant numbers of decision makers behave in a fashion sufficiently 
different from the underlying axioms that the model will not predict 
their choices. 
The N-M expected utility model is a model o(DM UR. The. 
model takes probabilities as given. But what of the more difficult case 
of decision making under uncertainty (DMUU)? How does o�e decide 
in the absence of theoretically derived or-empirically estimated 
probabilities of the states of nature? In 1954 Savage proposed the 
classic subjective expected utility (SE U) model. The principal result is: 
SEU: Given that a decision maker satisfies a particular set of 
axioms, there exist numbers s. (subjective probabilities), 
J 
and U ( x  .. ) (utilities) such that if he chooses the act, a., 
� . 
for which I:.s.U(x . .  ) is at a maximum, he chooses in accord 
J J lJ 
with his own preferences. 
Once the notion of subjective probability is accepted, the 
distinction between D:tviUR and DMUU need no longer be maintained. 
In principle, no probability is unknown or unknowable if probability 
me.ins degree of belief rather than something more "objective; 11 
One's beliefs about the likelihoods of events may very well be based 
on available objective evidence such as past relative frequency data, 
but even lacking such data one can still have beliefs. The SE U model 
currently is the most widely accepted model of DM U U  (or DMUR). 
The Savage axiom set is more extensive and more difficult 
to exposit than the N-M axiom set. Thus I will concentrate on one 
critical axiom that has received a good deal of attention. 
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Consider the following decision problem: 
81 82 I 83 •1 x y z 
•
2 
y x I z 
Figure 3 
Assume the decision maker prefers x to y. Then, in the Savage system, 
if he Chooses a1 in Fii:ure 1, we infer.that he regards·e1 
a; at least 
as probable as 92. (If not,
. 
he would have chosen a2J. Next consider 
Figure 4 which is assumed identical to Figure 3 except for the 
consequences under 8 3: 
e1 82 e, 
,, •
1 x 
y w 
•
2 
y x I w 
Figure 4 
One might expect that if the d�cision maker chooses a1 in Figure 
3, he 
' 
would also choose a
1 
in Figure 4. After all, although .the consequences 
of acts under 8 3 differ in the decision problems, the portion of the 
decision problems on which
.
acts differ is identical in the two decisioO.s. 
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This is the essence of one of Savage1s critical postulates--the well-know 
sure thing principle. The postulate demands that in situations such as 
those illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 the only admissible choices are 
' ' 
(a1
, a1} 
or (a2, a2) 
To consider the acceptability. of the sure thing principle let us 
consider an example offered by Ells.berg (1961).
* 
An urn contains 90 
balls, 30 of which are red the other 60 of which are black or yellow 
in unknown proportion. Consider the choices offered in Figure S. 
60 
30 
81 8z 83 
(Red) (Black) (Yellow) 
•1 $100 $ 0 $ 0  
•z $ 0 $100 $,0 
Figure 5 (Ellsberg} 
Ji th� decision maker chooses a1, he receives $100 if a red ball is 
drawn, $0 otherwise. If he chooses a2, he receives $100 if black 
is drawn, $0 otherwise. Thirty of the 90 balls are known to be red, 
but anywhere between 0 and 60 balls may be black. Many subjects 
chose a
1
• 
Next consider the choices offered in Figure 6. 
* • 
The reader may note that the Alla.is and Ells berg paradoxes are 
formally identical. 
60 
30 
8 l 8z 83 
(Red) (Black) (Yellow) 
a $100 0 $100 
3 
•• 0 $100 $100 
Figure 6 (Ellsberg) 
Figure 6 differs from Figure 5 only in that both acts now yield $100 
rather' than $0 if e 3 obtains. According. to the sure thirig pr
inciple 
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choice of a
1 
in Figure 5. implies choice of a3 in Figure 6. But students 
don1t always see it that way. Many prefer the 60/90 chance of $100 
given by a4 to the anywhere between 
30/90 and 90/90 cha.nee given by 
a3• But choice of a1 in Figure 5 implies 
s(91) > s(92
)3 
whereas choice of a 4 in Figure 6 implies 
s(91} + s(93l < s(92
) + s(93) 
and clearly we can't have it both ways.
* 
Nevertheless, intelligent 
subjects sometimes remain unconvinced by such demonstrations and 
** 
persist in their choice of (a1
, a4} Savage to the contrary noti.vithstanding. 
�'
The technically inclined may note that this pattern of beliefs 
violates the condition of finite additivity in that seemingly s(R) > s(B) 
but s(RUY) < s(BUY). 
"* 
In a highly interesting recent article Slavic and Tversky (1975) 
report that not only do subjects regularly violate the Savage S1J.re­
Thing Principle, but that additionally Ellsbe.rg-Allais arguments are 
more efficacious in inducing behavioral change than Savage arguments. 
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Clearly, no model of individual decision making will always 
predict perfectly. Individuals make mistakes; highly unusual decisions 
may call forth new modes of decision-making. But on the other hand if 
a non-trivial proportion of decision makers consistently and wilfully 
behaves contrary to the predictions of a given model, then at the least 
one !!lay suspect that the model is missing something. Such suspicions 
have led some researchers to search for an alternative to the SEU 
model of DMUU. The next section of this paper offers a brief 
introduction to this newer research. 
III. Ne\ver Models of DMUR 
In the EU and SE U models of DMUR valuations of consequences 
and likelihoods of events constitute the basis of decision. 11Risk11 simply 
describes a decision context in \vhich these models are (presumably) 
applicable. In recent years, however, a number of mathematical 
psychologists have focused more directly on the concept of risk, They 
have proposed models in which valuations of consequences, likelihoods 
of events, and attitudes toward risk constitute the basis of decision. 
For example, Coombs proposes "Portfolio Theory11 (PT) as an 
alternative to EU and SEU theory. For Coombs a decision over uncertain 
prospects is n • . •  a compromise between maximizing expecJ;.ed value 
and optimizing the level of risk. The nature of risk itself is undefined 
in Portfolio Theory . , . " (1974, p. 4), The second statement in the 
quotation 1night seem strange, but in his work Coomb.s makes assumptions 
about the concept of risk which go part way towards defining it. 
Consider two gambles: 
LA "' (
px, (1 p)y] 
LC= [qx, (1 
- q)y] (0 :0 p, q·:o l; p ' qi
, 
Next, form the compound gamble: 
LB = [rL A' (1 
- r)LCJ (O < r < 1)
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Now, according to the EU or SEU models, the utility of the compound 
gamble, LB, must be 1'between11 the utilities of the simple gambles of 
whi�h. it is composed. That is, of the six possible strong preference 
orderings over LA' LB and LC, utility maximizers can have only the 
two 11monotone11 orderings, LA> LB >Le, or LC> LB> .LA" 
For Coombs, however, there exists something called the 11risk11 
of a gamble. He makes two critical assumptions: (1) decision makers 
have preference functions over risk, functions which are single-p.eaked 
when expected value is constant; (2) given two gambles with the same 
expec
_
ted value, a compound gamble formed from these two has a level 
of risk 11between11 them. Consider Figure 7: 
Preference (a. ) (b.) 
<ill ([LJ 
LA LB 
.
L
C 
L
A 
LB LC 
Figure 7 
Assume that the three lotteries pictured have equal expected values but 
differ in ris"k {as yet undefined). In Figure·7a all of the lotteries fall 
Risk 
to the left of the decision maker1s optimum level of risk. Thus, under 
the assumptions of PT, he will rank the lotteries LC> LB
> LA
. But 
in Figure 7b the simple gambles LA and LC 
11bracket" the optimal level 
of risk, so the compound gamble LB is preferred to both of them.· 
In general, under PT one could observe not only the monotone rankings 
� 
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LA> LB > LC' and LC > LB> LA, but also the 11folded'' rankings 
LB> LA> LC and LB> LC >'LA" The remaining two orderings, 
LC> LA
> LB , and LA> LC> LB 
are admissible under. neither theory; 
Coombs considers these orderings errors (and similarly for intransiti­
vities). 
The preceding arguments were tested by Coombs in two experi­
ments. The patterns of subjects• choices were as follows: 
Orderings Consistent 
with PT and EU 
Orderings Consistent 
with PT but not EU 
Orderings Consistent 
with neither model 
Table 
� 
54% 
27 
19 
Exp. Z 
80% 
9 
5 
Naturally enough, the more inclusive PT can account for a greater 
proportion of orderings than the more exclusive EU theory. 
At least two questions arise from Coombs' experiments. 
First, what happens if the gambles differ in expected value? If LA 
had an expected value of $10 , LC' $0 , and the mixture LB , .$5, how 
many folded orderings would one find? Perhaps (probably) expected 
utilities are virtually equal in Coombs' experiments, thereby providing 
latitude for a normally unimportant variable to operate. 
More importantly, recall that the experiments are based on 
assumptions about an undefined concept. Coombs postulates single­
peaked preferences for risk. Why not allow single-caved preferences 
as 'veil (Figure 8)? 
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Preference 
\ 
'-----;-'--------L _______ L ___ Risk 
LA LB LC 
Figure 8 • 
This figure would desci.-ibe the risk preferences of someone who 
preferred big risks or none at all to moderate risks. Such preferences 
could generate many of the orderings Coombs considers errors and thus 
account for nearly 100% of the observed data. So long as we are dealing 
with an undefined, unobserved variable, what are reasonable assumptions 
to make about it? 
As if to address this query Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) have 
provided an axiomatization of risk which is logically independent of a 
. theory of risk preference or DMUR. B eginning with a few innocent 
appearing axioms they establish the following result (1970, pp. 542-543): 
�· There exists a real valued function, R, defined over a set of 
uncertain prospects, L
1
, L2, L3 , , . such that (1) Li is perceived as 
riskier than L. iff R(L.)> R(L.); (Z) the risk of the convolution of L .J 1 J 1 and L. equals R(L.) + R{L.); {3) if R1 is another function satisfying J ' J 
(1) and (2), then R1 differs from R only by a positive scale constant, 
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With some additional axioms Poll�tsek and Tversky prove the 
following more specific result: 
Regular Risk. L. is perceived as riskier than L. iff R(L.)> R(L.), where l J l' J 
R{L .. ) equals a linear combination of the variance and expectation of L .. 
' ' 
Pollatsek and Tversky go on to show that if a preference 
ordering is a function of regular risk it can not be represented by an 
NM utility function. Thus, there is a clear theoretical distinction 
between established models of DMUR and the newer formulations of 
mathematical psychologists. 
My intent in this section is simply to convey an impression of the 
provocative theories mathematical psychologists currently are develop­
ing. I think it is too early to judge the usefulness of such work for 
political scientists engaged in research involving a DMUR aspect, but 
it would behoove us to keep abreast of future developments. 
IV. Axiomatic Models of Collective Decision Making 
* 
The literature in this area is far too extensive to survey here. 
Ins tea!'.}, I will simply make som� general observations about .�his 
literature which appear to be relevant to social-psychological studies 
of group decision making. 
Axiornatic n1odels of collective decisicin making have a primarily 
negative thrust, They focus on the problems and pathologies which 
attend gr.cup choice. Most conclusions take the form, uaiven that a 
collective choice procedure satisfies axioms A1, A2 • .  , , ,An, it will not 
in general satisfy a (gi.ven) collective rationality condition. 11 
• See Shepsle (1974) and Plott (1972) for reviews, 
To illustrate, take the case of three decision makers each 
of whom has evaluated four alternatives, a, b, c, d. Our subjects 
have the following strong preference orderings: 
(i) 
@ 
0) 
a d c 
b a d 
c b a 
d c b 
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Suppose our three subjects are to make a group choice among a, b, c, 
d, What if they decide tO proceed by the method of majority rule? Well, 
they have problems. A majority (1 and 2) prefer a to b, and b to c. 
Another majority (1 and 3) prefers c to d. And still another majority 
(2 and 3) prefers d to a. Thus, the group's choice is cyclical: a > 
b > c > d > a and so on. The ultimate outcome is purely an artifact 
of the order of voting, i.e. the agenda. 
Is the prece.ding example merely a pathological special case? 
Not at all. We can insure that majority rule will not produce such cycles 
only by placing severe a priori constraints on the preference orderings 
held by individuals (Arrow, 1963; Black, 1958; Kramer, 1973; Plott, 
19681. Virtually every decision procedure falls subject to some 
pathology. As another example, what if our three man group agrees 
to use the method of marks rather than majority rule? The former is 
the familiar procedure of having individuals assign ranks to the 
alternatives under consideration, then selecting the alternative with 
the highest sum of ranks. Applied to our example the method of marks 
would produce: 
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a b c d 
- -- -- -
3 2 1 0 
2 1 0 3 
0 3 2 
6 3 4 -5 
Thus·, a would be the group choice. But, what if just prior to the 
balloting someone told the group that.the relatively low-valued b no 
longer was available? Well, in this case the method of marks would 
produce: 
a 
2 
1 
0 
3 
c 
0 
2 
3 
d 
0 
2 
3 
And the group would now express indifference among a, c, d. The 
method of marks is highly sensitive to the definition of the feasible set 
of alternatives, i.e. the agenda. 
The preceding examples employ certain alternatives, a, b, 
c, d, Does anything change when risk or uncertainty is introduced? 
Sever
.
al theoretical works (Shepsle, 1970; Zeckhaus er, 1969; Fishburn, 
1972) provide grounds for answering this question in the neg,;_tive, 
Admitting risky alternatives -- in the form of lotteries over social 
states -- into the domain of the social choice function essentially 
makes a bad situation worse. Assuming that individrial decision .makers 
satisfy the EU model or even weaker conditions it can be shown that 
�xpanding the domain of the social choice function ta include lotteries 
can upset an equilibr�um where one exists in the certainty context 
(presumably quite rare), but can not create an equilibrium from among 
the newly introduced lottery alternatives. Thus, the introduction of 
uncertainty into the collective choice problem only reinforces the 
points raised by our examples. 
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Axiomatic ,social choice theory does provide somewhat more 
tha'n a background of negative results'. For example, in addition to 
suggesting what axioms (i.e. ethical and procedural requirements) a 
decision procedure should satisfy (then proving logical incompatibility). 
some theorists seek to characterize existing institutions (e.g. majority 
rule) by specifying what axioms they do satisfy. Nevertheless, .!f One 
takes social choice theory seriously, one emerges with a rather· 
pessimistic outlook for the empirical study of group decision making, 
Group choice appears to be very different from individual choice, not 
just a generalization of it. Group choice frequently will not appear 
"ratiOnal" to an external observer. G10oups will be subject fo 
manipulation in ways that individuals will not, Ultimately, even 
alternatives regarded as highly undesirable by most group members 
can logically emerge as the group choice (Fishburn, 1974). 
Should one take social choice theory seriously? In the end I 
would answer both yes and no, for the kind of group choice addressed by 
social choice theory is a special kind in which individual preferences 
are presumed to be fixed. Individual preferences somehow get aggregated 
into a group choice, but individuals leave the arena of group decision 
. making holding the same preference with which they enter. I have 
the contrasting impression that social psychologists entertain the opposite 
presumption -- that the process of group decision making alters individual 
* 
beliefs and· preferences. I don1t profess to understand the mechanisms 
which operate to produce agreement or ttconsensus11 in groups, but I 
have obviously felt such mechanisms operate. 
* 
Considerable evidence for this presumption appears in the risky shift 
studies. See, for example Wallach, Kogan and Bern, 1962; Vinokur, 1971). 
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In sum, axiomatic models of collective decision are most 
relevant where individuals have clear preferences which are unlikely to 
change as a result of group interaction. Such models are less relevant 
where closely knit "teams11 strive to make a decision. If mechanisms 
are at work which produce unanimity, the negative results of social 
* 
choice theory typically lose their force. Thus, I think the wisest 
course is to exercise extreme analytic caution in moving from the 
individual to the group. In some cases group choice will be analogous to 
individual choice. In other cases it may be exceedingly difficult for the 
observer to account for group choice. And we should always be careful 
that we have the group choice as our data, Institutions (real world or 
experimental) generally will produce an outcome; whether such an outcome 
is a group choice in any meaningful sense is another matter. That 
observation is the invaluable contribution of axiomatic models of 
collective decision making. 
* 
The social choice theorist probably would respond to this comment with 
the observation that preferences for basic alternatives are not changing 
so much as additional considerations (desire to 'cooperate, deference, 
friendship, etc.) are being added. Fine. In this case I could simply 
re-phrase the argument along the following lines: the heterogeneity of 
preferences which underlies the negative results of social choice 
theory is not so empirically probable as is assumed once ltitangible 
personal factors are considered. 
. 
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